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This article examines the effects of credit to private sector on the business and trade activities. The effectiveness of rapid expansion in public and private borrowing through state's intervention after COVID-19 pandemic has been assessed in this study.

The model to determine the role of credit expansion is based on four equations estimated through panel least square technique on 18 years data of 186 countries.

It is concluded that credit to private sector and external debt improve the investment in infrastructure, which is a significant determinant of gross domestic product growth. Empirical evidences corroborate that higher number of firms using banks to finance their investment and the volume of broad money determine the magnitude of credit to private sector.

This study explores some new evidences and aspects of the credit financing which have not been discussed in this way before.

Motivated by significant global developments affecting the sell-side industry, in particular a shift toward passive investments and growing regulation, this study examines whether financial analyst coverage declined over the past decade and if any loss of analyst coverage is associated with a change in forecast accuracy.

After investigating, and confirming, a general decline in analyst following, the authors calculate the loss of analyst coverage relative to the firm-specific maximum between 2009 and 2013. In multivariate analyses, the authors then examine whether this loss of coverage differs across geographic region, firm size and capital market development, and whether it is associated with consensus analyst accuracy.

Results indicate that between 2011 and 2021, firm-specific analyst coverage globally declined 17.8%, while the decline in the EU was an even greater, 28.5%. Within the EU, results are most pronounced for small-cap firms. As a consequence of the loss of coverage, the authors observe a global decline in forecast accuracy, with EU small-cap firms and firms domiciled in EU non-developed capital markets faring the worst.

This study is the first to document a concerning global decline in analyst coverage over the past decade. The study results provide broad-based empirical support for anecdotal reports that smaller firms in the EU and those in EU non-developed capital markets bear the brunt of consequences stemming from changes in the sell-side analyst industry.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely, innovative thought structures and attitudes have almost always forced economic institutions and modes of behaviour to adjust. We learn from the history of economic doctrines how a particular theory emerged and whether, and in which environment, it could take root. We can see how a school evolves out of a common methodological perception and similar techniques of analysis, and how it has to establish itself. The interaction between unresolved problems on the one hand, and the search for better solutions or explanations on the other, leads to a change in paradigma and to the formation of new lines of reasoning. As long as the real world is subject to progress and change scientific search for explanation must out of necessity continue.

Richard Quandt has recently noted an increasing tendency on the part of professional economists to introspect their work and activities. Whether this trend derives from some existential angst brought on by a feeling that the marginal social return from the nth journal article does not differ significantly from zero, or whether it results from a desire to formalise sheer bloody‐mindedness (“my two page article in the American Economic Review is better than your 50 page survey in the Journal of Cerebral Economics”) is not our concern. We simply wish to move with the tide by producing our own survey of how British economists rank the “prestige” of the professional journals. Our survey results are reported below and it will be seen that they have been produced in a manner which makes them directly comparable to those produced for America by Hawkins, Ritter and Walter. We also offer some comparisons with the findings of Moore.

This paper presents rankings of economics journals taken from a recent survey of economics department heads. Different rankings were derived for those with different research areas and those associated with different types of academic institutions. It was found that rankings were quite similar for all respondents.

The economics literature on gender has expanded considerably in recent years, fueled in part by new sources of data, including from experimental studies of gender differences in preferences and other traits. At the same time, economists have been developing more realistic models of psychological and social influences on individual choices and the evolution of culture and social norms. Despite these innovations, much of the economics of gender has been left behind, and still employs a reductive framing in which gender gaps in economic outcomes are either due to discrimination or to “choice.” I suggest here that the persistence of this approach is due to several distinctive economic habits of mind – strong priors driven by market bias and gender essentialism, a perspective that views the default economic agent as male, and an oft-noted tendency to avoid complex problems in favor of those that can be modeled simply. I also suggest some paths forward.